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iterated belief revision and use the corresponding structures to analyze
extensive-form games. Choice frames can be used to represent a player’s
initial beliefs and disposition to change those beliefs when informed that it
is her turn to move. If the frame satisﬁes AGM-consistency and a natural
postulate for iterated belief revision, then it is rationalizable by a total
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1 Introduction
In [7] the notion of choice frame, borrowed from the rational choice literature,
was proposed as a semantics for the theory of one-stage belief revision put for-
ward by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson [1]. In this paper we extend the
semantics of choice frames to deal with iterated belief revision and use the cor-
responding structures to analyze extensive-form games. With every extensive
∗A frist draft of this paper was presented at the Workshop on “Language, Communication
and Rational Agency”, Stanford, May 2009 and at the Workshop on “Information processing,
rational belief change and social interaction”, Dagstuhl, August 2009.
1form one can associate a (possibly iterated) choice frame for every player, rep-
resenting the player’s initial beliefs and disposition to change those beliefs when
informed that it is her turn to move. If the structure satisﬁes AGM-consistency
and a natural postulate for iterated belief revision, then it is rationalizable by a
total pre-order on the set of histories. We show that three properties of this total
pre-order, together with the hypothesis of agreement among players, provide a
characterization of the notion of consistent assessment, which is the central com-
ponent of the notion of sequential equilibrium introduced by Kreps and Wilson
[15]. Consistent assessments were proposed by Kreps and Wilson as an attempt
to capture the concept of minimal belief revision. A number of authors have
tried to shed light on the technical notion of consistent assessment by relating
it to more intuitive concepts, such as “structural consistency” ([16]), “generally
reasonable extended assessment” ([11]), “stochastic independence” ([2], [14]).1
Our result provides a characterization of consistent assessments in terms of the
AGM theory of belief revision, through the notion of AGM-consistent choice
frame.
Consistent assessments were proposed as an embodiment of the notion of
“minimal” belief revision. Our characterization makes this precise, by relating
the technical notion of consistency (as the limit of a sequence of completely
mixed strategies and corresponding Bayesian beliefs) to the belief revision pos-
tulates of the AGM theory.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the AGM postu-
lates for belief revision and the semantics based on choice frames. In Section
3 we review the deﬁnition of extensive-form game, show how to associate with
an extensive form a choice frame for every player and prove the main charac-
terization result. In Section 4 we discuss the issue of iterated belief revision
that arises in extensive forms where some players move more than once along
some play. Section 5 deals with the other component of sequential equilibrium,
namely sequential rationality and provides a characterization of pure sequential
equilibria. A characterization of backward induction in extensive-form games
with perfect information is also provided. Section 6 concludes.
2 Choice frames and AGM-consistent beliefs
In this section we brieﬂy review the AGM theory of belief revision ([1], [12]) and
its semantics based on choice frames ([7]).
Let Φ be the set of formulas of a propositional language based on a countable
set S of atoms. Given a subset K ⊆ Φ, its deductive closure, denoted by [K],
is deﬁned as follows: ψ ∈ [K] if and only if there exist φ1,...,φn ∈ K (with
n ≥ 0) such that (φ1 ∧ ... ∧ φn) → ψ is a tautology. A set K ⊆ Φ is deductively
closed if K = [K] and it is consistent if [K]  = Φ. Let K be a consistent and
deductively closed set representing the agent’s initial beliefs and let Ψ ⊆ Φ be
a set of formulas representing possible items of information. A belief revision
function based on K is a function BK : Ψ → 2Φ (where 2Φ denotes the set
1Perea et al [23] oﬀer an algebraic characterization of consistent assessments
2of subsets of Φ) that associates with every formula φ ∈ Ψ (thought of as new
information) a set BK(φ) ⊆ Φ (thought of as the revised beliefs). If Ψ  = Φ then
BK is called a partial belief revision function, while if Ψ = Φ then BK is called
a full belief revision function.
Let BK : Ψ → 2Φ be a (partial) belief revision function and B
∗
K : Φ → 2Φ a
full belief revision function. We say that B
∗
K is an extension of BK if, for every
φ ∈ Ψ, B
∗
K(φ) = BK(φ).
A full belief revision function is called an AGM function if it satisﬁes the
following properties, known as the AGM postulates: ∀φ,ψ ∈ Φ,
(AGM1) BK(φ) = [BK(φ)].
(AGM2) φ ∈ BK(φ).
(AGM3) BK(φ) ⊆ [K ∪ {φ}].
(AGM4) if ¬φ / ∈ K, then [K ∪ {φ}] ⊆ BK(φ).
(AGM5) BK(φ) = Φ if and only if φ is a contradiction.
(AGM6) if φ ↔ ψ is a tautology then BK(φ) = BK(ψ).
(AGM7) BK(φ ∧ ψ) ⊆ [BK(φ) ∪ {ψ}].
(AGM8) if ¬ψ / ∈ BK(φ), then [BK(φ) ∪ {ψ}] ⊆ BK(φ ∧ ψ).
AGM1 requires the revised belief set to be deductively closed. AGM2 requires
that the information be believed. AGM3 says that beliefs should be revised
minimally, in the sense that no new formula should be added unless it can be
deduced from the information received and the initial beliefs. AGM4 says that if
the information received is compatible with the initial beliefs, then any formula
that can be deduced from the information and the initial beliefs should be part
of the revised beliefs. AGM5 requires the revised beliefs to be consistent, unless
the information φ is a contradiction (that is, ¬φ is a tautology). AGM6 requires
that if φ is propositionally equivalent to ψ then the result of revising by φ be
identical to the result of revising by ψ. AGM7 and AGM8 are a generalization
of AGM3 and AGM4 that requires BK(φ ∧ ψ) to be the same as the expansion
of BK(φ) by ψ, as long as ψ is compatible with BK(φ).
Choice frames provide a set-theoretic semantics for belief revision functions.
Deﬁnition 1 A choice frame is a triple   ,E,f  where
  is a non-empty set of states; subsets of   are called events.
E ⊆ 2  is a collection of events such that ∅ / ∈ E and   ∈ E.
f : E → 2  is a function that associates with every event E ∈ E an event
f(E) satisfying the following properties: (1) f(E) ⊆ E and (2) f(E)  = ∅.
In rational choice theory a set E ∈ E is interpreted as a set of available
alternatives and f(E) is interpreted as the subset of E which consists of the
chosen alternatives (see, for example, [25] and [27]). In our case, we think of the
elements of E as possible items of information and the interpretation of f(E) is
that, if informed that event E has occurred, the agent considers as possible all
and only the states in f(E). The set f( ) is interpreted as the states that are
initially considered possible.
3Note that in the literature (see, for example [25]) it is common to impose
some structure on the collection of events E (for example, that it be closed
under ﬁnite unions). On the contrarry, we allow E to be an arbitrary subset of
2  and typically think of E as containing only a small number of events. This
is typically the case in extensive-form games, as shown in the following section.
In order to interpret a choice frame   ,E,f  in terms of belief revision we
need to add a valuation V : S → 2  that associates with every atomic formula
p ∈ S the set of states at which p is true. The quadruple   ,E,f,V   is called
a model (or an interpretation) of   ,E,f . Given a model M =   ,E,f,V  ,
truth of an arbitrary formula at a state is deﬁned recursively as follows (ω |=M φ
means that formula φ is true at state ω in model M):
(1) for p ∈ S, ω |=M p if and only if ω ∈ V (p), (2) ω |=M ¬φ if and only if
ω  |=M φ and (3) ω |=M (φ ∨ ψ) if and only if either ω |=M φ or ω |=M ψ (or
both). The truth set of formula φ in model M is denoted by  φ M, that is,
 φ M = {ω ∈   : ω |=M φ}.
Given a model M =   ,E,f,V   we say that
• the agent initially believes that ψ if and only if f( ) ⊆  ψ M,
• the agent believes that ψ upon learning that φ if and only if (1)  φ M ∈ E
and (2) f( φ M) ⊆  ψ M.
Accordingly, we can associate with every model M a (partial) belief revision
function as follows. Let
KM = {φ ∈ Φ : f( ) ⊆  φ M},
ΨM = {φ ∈ Φ :  φ M ∈ E},
BKM : ΨM → 2Φ given by BKM(φ) = {ψ ∈ Φ : f( φ M) ⊆  ψ M}.
(1)
What properties must a choice frame satisfy in order for it to be the case
that the (typically partial) belief revision function associated with an arbitrary
interpretation of it can be extended to a full AGM belief revision function? This
question motivates the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 2 A choice frame   ,E,f  is AGM-consistent if, for every model
M =   ,E,f,V   based on it, the (partial) belief revision function BKM asso-
ciated with M (see (1)) can be extended to a full belief revision function that
satisﬁes the AGM postulates.
Recall that a binary relation ￿ on   is a total pre-order if it is complete
(∀ω,ω′ ∈  , either ω ￿ ω′ or ω′ ￿ ω) and transitive (∀ω,ω′,ω′′ ∈  , if ω ￿ ω′
and ω′ ￿ ω′′ then ω ￿ ω′′).
Deﬁnition 3 A choice frame   ,E,f  is rationalizable if there exists a total
pre-order ￿ on   such that, for every E ∈ E, f(E) = {ω ∈ E : ω ￿ ω′,∀ω′ ∈
E}.
4The interpretation of ω ￿ ω′ is that state ω is at least as plausible as state ω′
(or ω′ is more implausible than or as implausible as ω). Thus in a rationalizable
choice frame   ,E,f , for every E ∈ E, f(E) is the set of most plausible states
in E. The following proposition is proved in [7]:
Proposition 4 Let   ,E,f  be a choice frame where   is ﬁnite. Then   ,E,f 
is AGM-consistent if and only if it is rationalizable
On the basis of Proposition 4, rationalizable choice frames can be viewed as
providing a semantics for one-stage partial belief revision functions that obey
the AGM postulates.2 In the next section we use choice frames to analyze
extensive-form games.
3 Choice frames in extensive-form games
We shall use the history-based deﬁnition of extensive-form game (see, for ex-
ample, [19]).3 If A is a set, we denote by A∗ the set of ﬁnite sequences in A.
If h =  a1,...,ak  ∈ A∗ and 1 ≤ j ≤ k, the sequence h′ =  a1,...,aj  is called
a preﬁx of h. If h =  a1,...,ak  ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A, we denote the sequence
 a1,...,ak,a  ∈ A∗ by ha.





• A ﬁnite set of actions A with a distinguished element called the null action
and denoted by ∅.
• A ﬁnite set of histories H ⊆ A∗ which is closed under preﬁxes (that is, if
h ∈ H and h′ ∈ A∗ is a preﬁx of h, then h′ ∈ H) and is such that the
null action is a preﬁx of every history (that is, ∀h ∈ H,  ∅  is a preﬁx
of h). A history h ∈ H such that, for every a ∈ A, ha / ∈ H, is called
a terminal history. The set of terminal histories is denoted by Z. Let
D = H \ Z denote the set of non-terminal or decision histories. For every
history h ∈ H, we denote by A(h) the set of actions available at h, that is,
A(h) = {a ∈ A : ha ∈ H}. Thus A(h)  = ∅ if and only if h ∈ D. We shall
assume throughout that A =
￿
h∈D A(h) (that is, we restrict attention to
actions that are available at some decision history).
• A ﬁnite set N = {1,...n} of players. An additional player, called chance,
might also be added.
2For an investigation of the relationship between choice frames and non-monotonic infer-
ence see Lehmann [17].
3Similar structures were introduced in the computer science literature by Parikh and Ra-
manujam ([21], [22]; see also [20]). These sructures are more general than extensive-form
games in that they specify a player’s information at every node, that is, not only at nodes
where the player himself has to move. Hoewever, as shown in [3] and [4], it is possible to
extend the deﬁnition of extensive-form game by specifying, for every node, the information
that every player has at that node.
4Given an extensive form, one obtains an extensive game by adding, for every player
i ∈ N, a utility or payoﬀ function Ui : Z → R (where R denotes the set of real numbers and
Z the set of terminal histories).
5• A function P : D → N ∪ {chance} that assigns a player to each non-
terminal history. Thus P(h) is the player who moves at history h. A
game is said to be without chance moves if P(h) ∈ N for every h ∈ D.
For every i ∈ N ∪ {chance}, let Di = P−1(i) be the histories assigned
to player i. Thus {Dchance,D1,...,Dn} is a partition of D. We follow
Kreps and Wilson [15] in assuming that chance moves occur at most at
the beginning of the game, that is, either Dchance = ∅ or Dchance = { ∅ }
(recall that ∅ is the null action). If  ∅  is assigned to chance, then a
probability distribution over A( ∅ ) is given.
• For each player i ∈ N, an equivalence relation ≈i on Di. The interpreta-
tion of h ≈i h′ is that, when choosing an action at history h ∈ Di, player i
does not know whether she is moving at h or at h′. The equivalence class
of h ∈ Di is denoted by Ii(h) and is called an information set of player
i; thus Ii(h) = {h′ ∈ Di : h ≈i h′}. The following restriction applies:
if h′ ∈ Ii(h) then A(h′) = A(h), that is, the set of actions available to a
player is the same at any two histories that belong to the same information
set of that player.
• The following property, known as perfect recall, is satisﬁed: for every
player i ∈ N, if h1,h2 ∈ Di, a ∈ A(h1) and h1a is a preﬁx of h2 then for
every h′ ∈ Ii(h2) there exists an h ∈ Ii(h1) such that ha is a preﬁx of h′.
Intuitively, perfect recall requires a player to remember what she knew in
the past and what actions she took previously.5
Figure 1 shows an extensive form without chance moves where
A = {a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,m,n}, H = D∪Z with (to simplify the notation we write
a instead of  ∅,a , ac instead of  ∅,a,c , etc.) D = {∅,a,b,ac,ad,acf,ade,adf},
Z = {ace,acfg,acfh,adeg,adeh,adfm,adfn,bm,bn}, A(∅) = {a,b}, A(a) =
{c,d}, A(ac) = A(ad) = {e,f}, A(acf) = A(ade) = {g,h}, A(adf) = A(b) =
{m,n}, N = {1,2,3,4}, P(∅) = 1, P(a) = 2, P(ac) = P(ad) = 3, P(acf) =
P(ade) = P(adf) = P(b) = 4, ≈1 = {(∅,∅)}, ≈2 = {(a,a)},
≈3 = {(ac,ac),(ac,ad),(ad,ac),(ad,ad)} and
≈4 = {(acf,acf),(acf,ade),(ade,acf),(ade,ade),(adf,adf),(adf,b),(b,adf),(b,b)}.
The information sets containing more than one history are shown as rounded
rectangles. Thus, for example, I4(b) = {adf,b}. The root of the tree represents
the null action ∅.
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An extensive form without chance moves
Figure 1
Notation 5 We shall write h ∈ I(h′) as a short-hand for “h ∈ Ii(h′) for some
i ∈ N”.
Remark 6 In order to simplify the notation in the proofs, we shall assume
that the same action cannot be available at diﬀerent information sets: ∀h,h′ ∈
H,∀a ∈ A, if a ∈ A(h) ∩ A(h′) then h ∈ I(h′).6 The extensive form of Figure
1 satisﬁes this assumption.
We begin by restricting attention to the class of extensive forms where no
player moves more than once along any history. That is, for every history
h =  ∅,a1,...,am , if h1 and h2 are preﬁxes of h with P(h1) = P(h2) then
h1 = h2 (recall that P(h) is the player who moves at h). The extensive form
represented in Figure 1 satisﬁes this property.
Choice frames can be used to represent, for every player, her initial beliefs
and her disposition to change those beliefs when it is her turn to move. Given
an extensive form, we can associate with every i ∈ N a choice frame   ,Ei,fi 
as follows:   = H (the set of histories), E ∈ Ei if and only if either E = H or
E consists of an information set of player i together with all the continuation
histories. Recall that, if h ∈ Di, player i’s information set that contains h is
denoted by Ii(h); that is, Ii(h) = {h′ ∈ H : h′ ≈i h}. We shall denote by   Ii(h)
the set Ii(h) together with the continuation histories: for h ∈ Di,
  Ii(h) = {x ∈ H : ∃h′ ∈ Ii(h) such that h′ is a preﬁx of x}. (2)
6See Footnote 17 in the Appendix for an explanation of how the proofs would have to be
written without this convention.
7Thus
Ei = {H} ∪ {  Ii(h) : h ∈ Di}. (3)
We call   Ii(h) the augmented information set of player i at decision history
h ∈ Di.7
Finally, the function fi provides conditional beliefs about past and future
moves.8
Note that in the class of extensive forms we are restricting attention to in
this section (namely extensive forms where no player moves more than once
along any history), for every player i ∈ N and for every h,h′ ∈ Di, either
  Ii(h) =   Ii(h′) or   Ii(h) ∩   Ii(h′) = ∅. That is, any two diﬀerent augmented
information sets are disjoint.
If we assume that the choice frame of player i is AGM consistent, then, by
Proposition 4, there exists a total pre-order ￿i on H that rationalizes fi (that
is, for every E ∈ Ei, fi(E) = {h ∈ E : h ￿i h′,∀h′ ∈ E}).
What are natural properties to impose on these total pre-orders, that is,
on the associated beliefs? We shall discuss four properties and show that they
characterize the notion of consistent assessment, which is the central component
of the notion of sequential equilibrium introduced in [15].
The ﬁrst property expresses the notion of agreement of beliefs, in the sense
that the players share the same initial beliefs and the same disposition to change
those beliefs in response to the same information:9
∃ ￿ ⊆ H × H : ∀i ∈ N, ￿i = ￿ . (P1)
Note that P1 is consistent with the players holding diﬀerent beliefs during any
particular play of the game, since they will typically receive diﬀerent informa-
tion.
The remaining properties will be stated in terms of the common pre-order
￿ given by P1. Recall that the interpretation of h ￿ h′ is that history h is at
least as plausible as history h′ (or h′ is more implausible than or as implausible
as h).
7For example, in the extensive form of Figure 1, E4 = {H,E1,E2}, where E1 =
{acf,ade,acfg,acfh,adeg,adeh} and E2 = {adf,b,adfm,adfn,bm,bn}.
8For example, in the extensive form of Figure 1 one possibility for Player 4 is: f4(H) =
{a,ac,ace}, f4(E1) = {acf,acfh} and f(E2) = {b,bm}, where E1 and E2 are as given in the
previous footnote. The interpretation of this is that Player 4 initially believes that Player 1
will play a, Player 2 will follow with c and Player 3 with e (so that Player 4 does not expect
to be asked to make any choices). If informed that she is at her information set on the left
then whe would continue to believe that Player 1 played a and Player 2 followed with c, but
she would now believe that Player 3 chose f and she herself plans to choose h. If informed
that she is at her information set on the right then whe would believe that Player 1 played b
and she herself plans to choose m.
9This property can be viewed as an expression of the notion of a “common prior” (see, for
example, [5]), which is pervasive in game theory.
8The second property says that adding an action to a history h cannot yield
a more plausible history than h itself:
∀h ∈ D, ∀a ∈ A(h), h ￿ ha. (P2)
Remark 7 It follows from Property P2 that, for every h,h′ ∈ H, if h′ is a
preﬁx of h then h′ ￿ h.10
The third property says that at every decision history h there is some action
a such that adding a to h yields a history which is at least as plausible as h;
furthermore, any such action a performs the same role with any other history
that belongs to the same information set:
∀h ∈ D,
(1) ∃a ∈ A(h) : ha ￿ h and
(2) ∀a ∈ A(h), ∀h′ ∈ I(h), if ha ￿ h then h′a ￿ h′.
(P3)
Notation 8 We write h ∼ h′ (with the interpretation that h is as plausible as
h′) as a short-hand for “h ￿ h′ and h′ ￿ h” and we write h ≺ h′ (with the
interpretation that h is more plausible than h′) as a short-hand for “h ￿ h′ and
h′  ￿ h”.
Remark 9 It follows from Properties P2 and P3 that, for every decision his-
tory h, there is at least one action a at h such that, for every h′ in the same
information set as h, h′a is just as plausible as h′: ∀h ∈ D, ∃a ∈ A(h) : h ∼ ha
and if h′ ∈ I(h), then h′ ∼ h′a. We call such actions plausibility preserving.
A function F : H → N (where N denotes the set of natural numbers) is an
integer-valued representation of ￿ if F( ∅ ) = 0 and, ∀h,h′ ∈ H, h ￿ h′ if and
only if F(h) ≤ F(h′). Let R be the set of integer-valued representations of ￿.
Since H is ﬁnite, R  = ∅.11 We call an integer-valued representation F of ￿
action-based if,
∀h,h′ ∈ D, ∀a ∈ A(h), if h′ ∈ I(h) then
F(ha) − F(h) = F(h′a) − F(h′).
(4)
10In fact, if h′ is a preﬁx of h then h = h′a1...am for some (possibly none) a1,...,am ∈ A,
so that, by Property P2, h′ ￿ h′a1 ￿ h′a1a2 ￿ ... ￿ h′a1...am = h and thus, by transitivity
of ￿, h′ ￿ h.
11In fact, a natural integer-valued representation is the following. Deﬁne H0 = {h ∈ H :
h ￿ x, ∀x ∈ H}, H1 = {h ∈ H \ H0 : h ￿ x, ∀x ∈ H\H0} and, in general for every integer
k ≥ 1, Hk = {h ∈ H \ H0 ∪...∪ Hk−1 : h ￿ x, ∀x ∈ H \ H0 ∪...∪ Hk−1}. Since H is ﬁnite,
there is an m ∈ N such that {H0,...,Hm} is a partition of H and, for every j,k ∈ N, with
j < k ≤ m, and for every h,h′ ∈ H, if h ∈ Hj and h′ ∈ Hk then h ≺ h′. Deﬁne F : H → N
as follows: F(h) = k if and only if h ∈ Hk. The function F so deﬁned is an integer-valued
representation of ￿.
9For example, consider the extensive form represented in Figure 2 and the
following total pre-order ￿: ∅ ∼ a ≺ b ∼ be ≺ bf ≺ c ∼ ce ≺ d ≺ cf. The ﬁrst
column in Table 1 reproduces this total pre-order with the convention that if
x and y are on the same line, then x ∼ y and if x is above y then x ≺ y; the
second and third columns give two integer-valued representations of ￿, F1 and
F2. F1 is the representation described in Footnote 11 and is not action-based,
since c ∈ I(b) and F1(bf)−F1(b) = 2−1 = 1 while F1(cf)−F1(c) = 5−3 = 2.








∅, a 0 0
b, be 1 1
bf 2 3
c, ce 3 4
d 4 5
cf 5 6
Two representations of a total pre-order
for the extensive form of Figure 2.
Table 1
The fourth (and last) property says that among the integer-valued represen-
tations of ￿ there is at least one which is action-based:
There exists an F ∈ R which is action-based. (P4)
Not every total pre-order satisﬁes property P4. To see this, consider the
extensive form of Figure 3 and the following total pre-order, which is illustrated
in Table 2:
∅ ∼ a ≺ b ∼ bg ∼ d ∼ dr ≺ bh ∼ ds ≺ c ∼ cg ∼ e ∼ er ≺ f ∼ es ≺ ch.
This total pre-order does not have an action-based integer-valued representation.
In fact, ﬁx an arbitrary integer-valued representation F (we know that there
exists at least one). Then, since b ∼ d and bh ∼ ds, it must be that F(b) = F(d)
and F(bh) = F(ds). Thus F(bh) − F(b) = F(ds) − F(d). Furthermore, since
c ∼ e and es ≺ ch, it must be that F(c) = F(e) and F(es) < F(ch).Thus
F(es) − F(e) < F(ch) − F(c), so that if F(ds) − F(d) = F(es) − F(e) then
F(bh) − F(b) < F(ch) − F(c). Hence action basedness is violated, since it
requires F(ds)−F(d) = F(es)−F(e) and F(bh)−F(b) = F(ch)−F(c) (because














b, bg, d, dr
bh, ds
c, cg, e, er
f, es
ch
A total pre-order for the extensive form of Figure 3
which does not have an action-based representation.
Table 2
Note that Properties P2-P4 are independent of each other. For example,
the total pre-order of Table 2 (for the extensive form illustrated in Figure 3)
satisﬁes properties P2 and P3 (the plausibility preserving actions are a, g and
r) but violates P4. Similar examples can be constructed that satisfy two of the
properties but not the remaining one.12
If the beliefs of player i are rationalized by a total pre-order ￿ on H, then
the following holds: if the play of the game reaches history h ∈ Di then player
i receives information   Ii(h) and revises her previous beliefs to fi(  Ii(h)) = {h′ ∈
12Consider the extensive form of Figure 2 and the following total pre-order: ∅ ≺ a ≺ b ∼
be ≺ bf ≺ c ∼ ce ≺ d ≺ cf, which violates P3 since there is no plausibility preserving
action at the root. However, it satisﬁes P2 and P4. In fact, the following is an action-based
representation:
∅ a b, be bf c, ce d cf
0 1 2 4 5 6 7 .
Now consider the following total pre-order: ∅ ∼ a ≺ bf ≺ b ∼ be ≺ cf ≺ d ≺ c ∼ ce, which
violates P2 since bf ≺ b. However, it satisﬁes P3 (the plausibility preserving actions are a
and e) and P4. In fact, the following is an action-based representation:
∅ a bf b, be cf d c, ce
0 1 2 4 5 6 7 .
11  Ii(h) : h′ ￿ x, ∀x ∈   Ii(h)}, that is, the histories that are most plausible given
her information constitute her revised beliefs.
Before we proceed to our main result, we recall the notion of sequential
equilibrium ([15]), which is the most widely used solution concept in economics
and applied game theory. Given an extensive form, a pure strategy of player
i ∈ N is a function that associates with every information set of player i a
choice at that information set, that is, a function si : Di → A such that (1)
si(h) ∈ A(h) and (2) if h′ ∈ Ii(h) then si(h′) = si(h). For example, one of
the pure strategies of Player 4 in the extensive form illustrated in Figure 1 is
s4(acf) = s4(ade) = g, s4(adf) = s4(b) = m. A behavior strategy of player i is
a collection of probability distributions, one for each information set, over the
actions available at that information set; that is, a function σi : Di → ∆(A)
(where ∆(A) denotes the set of probability distributions over A) such that
(1) σi(h) is a probability distribution over A(h) and (2) if h′ ∈ Ii(h) then
σi(h′) = σi(h). We denote by σi(h)(a) the probability assigned to a ∈ A(h) by
σi(h). Note that a pure strategy is a special case of a behavior strategy where
each probability distribution is degenerate. A behavior strategy σi of player i
is completely mixed if, for every h ∈ Di and for every a ∈ A(h), σi(h)(a) > 0. A
behavior strategy proﬁle is an n-tuple σ = (σ1,...,σn) where, for every i ∈ N,
σi is a behavior strategy of player i.
A system of beliefs, is a collection of probability distributions, one for every
information set, over the elements of that information set, that is, a function
  : D → ∆(H) such that (1) if h ∈ Di then  (h) is a probability distribution
over Ii(h) and (2) if h ∈ Di and h′ ∈ Ii(h) then  (h) =  (h′). Note that a
completely mixed behavior strategy proﬁle yields, using Bayes’ rule, a unique
system of beliefs.
An assessment is a pair (σ, ) where σ is a behavior strategy proﬁle and  





of completely mixed strategy proﬁles such that, letting
 m be the unique system of beliefs associated - using Bayes’ rule - to σm,
limm→∞(σm, m) = (σ, ).
Kreps and Wilson ([15]) proposed the notion of consistent assessment as
an attempt to capture the concept of minimal belief revision. As noted in the
Introduction, a number of authors have tried to shed light on the notion of
consistent assessment by relating it to more intuitive notions. The following
proposition, which is proved in the Appendix, provides a characterization of
consistent assessments in terms of the AGM theory of belief revision [1], through
the notion of AGM-consistency of choice frames.13
Given an extensive form, we say that a proﬁle {  ,Ei,fi }i∈N of AGM-
consistent choice frames (where   = H and Ei is given by (3)) satisﬁes properties
P1-P4 if the collection of total pre-orders {￿i}i∈N that rationalize {  ,Ei,fi }i∈N
(whose existence is guaranteed by Proposition 4) satisﬁes properties P1-P4 (that
13Sequential rationality is discussed in Section 5.
12is, there exists a common total pre-order ￿ on H that rationalizes those choice
frames and satisﬁes properties P2 − P4).
Proposition 10 Fix an extensive form where no player moves more than once
along any history. Then
(a) If the players’ initial beliefs and disposition to revise those beliefs are
represented by a proﬁle of AGM-consistent choice frames that satisﬁes properties
P1-P4 then there exists a consistent assessment (σ, ) such that (letting ￿ be
a total pre-order on H that rationalizes those choice frames), for all i ∈ N,
h ∈ Di and a ∈ A(h), (i) σi(h)(a) > 0 if and only if h ∼ ha and (ii)  (h) > 0
if and only if h ￿ h′ for every h′ ∈   Ii(h);14
(b) if (σ, ) is a consistent assessment then there exists a proﬁle of AGM-
consistent choice frames that satisﬁes properties P1-P4 such that (letting ￿ be
a total pre-order on H that rationalizes those choice frames), for every i ∈ N,
h ∈ Di and a ∈ A(h), (i) h ∼ ha if and only if σi(h)(a) > 0 and (ii) for every
h′ ∈   Ii(h), h ￿ h′ if and only if  (h) > 0.
4 Iterated belief revision
In an arbitrary extensive form there may be players who move more than once
along some histories. If i is such a player, then the set Ei deﬁned above (see
(3)) will contain two sets E and F such that F ⊆ E and there is a history
along which player i receives ﬁrst information E and then, at a later moment,
information F. Indeed, it is a consequence of the property of perfect recall
that, for every player i ∈ N and for every h,h′ ∈ Di, if h is a preﬁx of h′ then
  Ii(h′) ⊆   Ii(h). Because of the possibility of sequential informational inputs, we
are outside the scope of one-shot belief revision and it is no longer suﬃcient
to appeal to AGM consistency in order to guarantee the existence of a total
pre-order that rationalizes the beliefs of a player. In this section we argue that
- within the context of extensive forms - rationalizability by a total pre-order is
a natural property even in situations involving sequential informational inputs.
Iterated belief revision, that is, the evolution of beliefs over time in response
to sequences of informational inputs, has been investigated extensively in the
literature (see, for example, [8], [9], [10], [13], [18], [26]). AGM belief revision
functions map a belief set K ⊆ Φ and an informational input φ ∈ Φ into a
new belief set BK(φ) ⊆ Φ. While such functions are suﬃcient for modeling
one-stage belief revision, it has been argued (see, for example, [18] and [24])
that, in the context of iterated belief revision, one should model the evolutions
of belief states or epistemic states, rather than simply of belief sets. A belief
state is a pair (K,BK), consisting of a belief set together with a disposition
14Recall - see (2) - that   Ii(h) is the information set that contains h together with the
continuation histories and that if   ,Ei,fi  is the choice frame of player i then   = H and
Ei = {H} ∪ {  Ii(h) : h ∈ Di} (see (3)).
13to revise one’s beliefs, as captured by the belief revision function BK. Thus
iterated belief revision should be construed as a function that maps a belief
state (K,BK) and an informational input φ into a new belief state (K′,B′
K). In
particular, one should allow for the possibility that, after learning that φ, one
changes the disposition to revise one’s beliefs; in other words, in general it is
possible that B′
K  = BK.
Fix the set of states  . A choice frame   ,E,f  incorporates both the
initial beliefs and the disposition to revise those beliefs; thus it can be regarded
as representing a belief state. In accordance with the view expressed above,
iterated belief revision can be captured semantically by a pair  C,B  where C is
a set of choice frames and B is a function that maps a pair consisting of a choice
frame   ,E,f  ∈ C and an information input E ∈ E into a new choice frame in
C. We call the pair  C,B  an iterated choice structure. We require that, for all
  ,E,f  ∈ C, B(  ,E,f , ) =   ,E,f , that is, the trivial informational input
  does not change the belief state. Furthermore, if   ,E′,f′  = B(  ,E,f ,E),
consistency requires that
f′( ) = f(E). (5)
In fact, if the agent’s initial beliefs are f( ) and she learns that E, then -
according to her initial belief state - her revised beliefs are f(E) and these
constitute the initial beliefs in the new belief state   ,E′,f′ , which are given
by f′( ).
Deﬁnition 11 An iterated choice structure  C,B  is AGM-consistent if every
choice frame   ,E,f  ∈ C is AGM-consistent (see Deﬁnition 2).
From now on we shall restrict attention to AGM-consistent iterated choice
structures.
Iterated choice structures can be represented by means of rooted trees. Let
t0 be the root of the tree. Associate with it the initial belief state   ,E,f .
For every E ∈ E draw an arrow out of t0 leading to a new node t and associate
with t the choice frame   ,E′,f′  = B(  ,E,f ,E) and proceed similarly for
every E′ ∈ E′. Figure 4 provides an illustration where   = {α,β,γ,δ} and the
initial belief state   ,E,f  is given by E = { ,{β,γ,δ},{γ,δ}}, f ( ) = {α},
f({β,γ,δ}) = {β} and f({γ,δ}) = {γ}. We represent the elements of E as
rectangles and the function f as ovals inside the rectangles. Letting   ,E′,f′  =
B(  ,E,f ,{β,γ,δ}) we have that E′ = { ,{α,β,δ},{γ,δ}} and f′ ( ) = {β},
f′({α,β,δ}) = {β} and f′({γ,δ}) = {δ}. Note that, as required by (5), f′ ( ) =
f({β,γ,δ}) = {β}. Note also that the two choice frames associated with nodes
t0 and t3 in Figure 4 are AGM-consistent, since they are rationalizable (although
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Figure 4
Representing an iterated choice structure by means of a tree.
If   ,E′,f′  = B(  ,E,f ,E) (with E ∈ E) with abuse of notation we shall
denote f′ by Bf,E (thus Bf,E : E′ → 2 ).
The proof of the following lemma is given in the Appendix.
Lemma 12 Let   ,E,f  be a choice frame and E,F ∈ E be such that F ⊆ E
and f(E) ∩ F  = ∅. Let   ,E′,f′  = B(  ,E,f ,E) and suppose that F ∈ E′.
Then if both   ,E,f  and   ,E′,f′  are AGM-consistent, f′(F) = f(F). More
succinctly:
if F ⊆ E and f(E) ∩ F  = ∅ then Bf,E(F) = f(F). (6)
Lemma 12 says that the following is an implication of AGM-consistency:
when F ⊆ E, if the agent is ﬁrst informed that E and, in her revised beliefs,
she does not rule out F, then - if she is next informed that F - the propositions
that she believes are the same as the ones that she would have believed had
she been informed that F to start with.15 Lemma 12 is trivially satisﬁed if
the condition f(E) ∩ F  = ∅ does not hold. For example, in the structure
illustrated in Figure 4, taking E = {β,γ,δ} and F = {γ,δ} we have that, since
15A stronger result than (6) can be proved, namely that if E,F ∈ E are such that (E∩F) ∈ E
and f(E) ∩ F  = ∅ then Bf,E(F) = f(E ∩ F). However, for our purposes it is suﬃcient to
focus on the weaker version (6).
15f(E) = {β}, f(E) ∩ F = ∅ and thus (6) is vacuously satisﬁed; yet the agent
responds diﬀerently to the initial information that F (f(F) = {γ}) relative
to the situation where the information that F is preceded by the less precise
information that E (f′(F) = {δ}). It seems that an introspective agent ought
to be reluctant to manifest such a capricious disposition to change his beliefs.
Thus we shall assume the following strengthening of (6) (obtained by dropping
the clause f(E) ∩ F  = ∅):
if F ⊆ E then Bf,E(F) = f(F). (7)
According to (7) the agent will hold the same beliefs no matter whether he
is informed that F right away or whether he is ﬁrst informed that E and then
that F, whenever F ⊆ E. Note that this principle is implied by the best-known
theories of iterated belief revision (see, for example, [8], [9], [10], [13], [18], [26]).
We shall now restrict attention to iterated choice structures that satisfy the
following property, which we call information reﬁnement:
if   ,E′,f′  = B(  ,E,f ,E) then, for every S ∈ E′, S ⊆ E. (8)
Information reﬁnement says that if the agent is ﬁrst informed that E and,
later on, is informed that F, then F ⊆ E. Hence the agent never receives
information that contradicts earlier information. Note, however, that (8) does
not rule out the possibility that every new piece of information contradicts the
agent’s previous beliefs, as illustrated in Figure 5.
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Information reﬁnement does not rule out repeated surprises.
The property of information reﬁnement is satisﬁed in extensive forms. In
fact, as noted in the previous section, it follows from the property of perfect
16recall that, for every player i ∈ N and for every h,h′ ∈ Di, if h is a preﬁx of h′
then   Ii(h′) ⊆   Ii(h).
Applying the iterated belief revision principle (7) to iterated choice struc-
tures that satisfy information reﬁnement we obtain the following property. Let
￿ be the total pre-order on   that rationalizes the choice frame   ,E,f  (see
Proposition 4), that is, for every S ∈ E, f(S) = {ω ∈ S : ω ￿ x,∀x ∈ S}. Let
E ∈ E and   ,E′,f′  = B(  ,E,f ,E). Then
∀T ∈ E ∩ E′, f′(T) = f(T) = {ω ∈ T : ω ￿ x,∀x ∈ T} (9)
that is, the same total pre-order ￿ rationalizes both f(T) and f′(T). The above
considerations motivate the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 13 An iterated choice structure with information reﬁnement  C,B 
is rationalizable if there exists a total pre-order ￿ of   such that, for every
choice frame   ,E,f  ∈ C and for every E ∈ E, f(E) = {ω ∈ E : ω ￿ x,∀x ∈
E}.
Thus a rationalizable iterated choice structure with information reﬁnement
 C,B  is equivalent to a one-stage choice frame   ,E,f  where E is the union of
the domains of the choice frames that belong to C. For example, let  C,B  be
the following iterated choice structure: C = {  ,E1,f1 ,  ,E2,f2 ,  ,E3,f3 }
with E1 = { ,E,F}, E2 = { ,E1,E2}, E3 = { ,F1,F2} and, for k = 1,2,
Ek ⊆ E and Fk ⊆ F; B(  ,E1,f1 ,E) =   ,E2,f2  and B(  ,E1,f1 ,F) =
  ,E3,f3 . Then  C,B  is equivalent to the choice frame   ,E,f  where E =
E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E3 and f is deﬁned by f(S) = {ω ∈ S : ω ￿ x,∀x ∈ S} (for every
S ∈ E),where ￿ is a total pre-order that rationalizes  C,B .
The characterization of consistent assessments given in Proposition 10 re-
quires, for every player, the existence of a total pre-order on the set of histories
that rationalizes the beliefs of that player. For extensive forms where no player
moves more than once along any play, the existence of a total pre-order is guar-
anteed by AGM-consistency of the choice frame representing a player’s initial
beliefs and disposition to revise those beliefs. For arbitrary extensive forms one
needs to add to the hypothesis of AGM-consistency the natural iterated belief
revision principle discussed above, which requires an agent’s beliefs to be the
same in the case where he learns that F as in the case where he ﬁrst learns
that E and then that F, whenever F ⊆ E. Such a principle is captured by
the requirement that the iterated choice structure be rationalizable (Deﬁnition
13). We argued above that, in the context of information reﬁnement (which
is necessarily satisﬁed in extensive forms with perfect recall), this principle of
iterated belief revision seems very plausible and indeed it is implied by the best-
known theories of iterated belief revision (see [8], [9], [10], [13], [18], [26]). Thus
Proposition 10 can be generalized as follows, without the need to make any
adjustments to the proof.
17Proposition 14 Fix an arbitrary extensive form. Then
(a) If the players’ beliefs and belief revision policies are represented by a
proﬁle of (possibly iterated) rationalizable choice frames that satisﬁes properties
P1-P4 then there exists a consistent assessment (σ, ) such that (letting ￿ be
a total pre-order on H that rationalizes those choice frames), for all i ∈ N,
h ∈ Di and a ∈ A(h), (i) σi(h)(a) > 0 if and only if h ∼ ha and (ii)  (h) > 0
if and only if h ￿ h′ for every h′ ∈   Ii(h);
(b) if (σ, ) is a consistent assessment then there exists a proﬁle of (possibly
iterated) rationalizable choice frames that satisﬁes properties P1-P4 such that
(letting ￿ be a total pre-order on H that rationalizes those choice frames), for
every i ∈ N, h ∈ Di and a ∈ A(h), (i) h ∼ ha if and only if σi(h)(a) > 0 and
(ii) for every h′ ∈   Ii(h), h ￿ h′ if and only if  (h) > 0.
5 Sequential rationality, pure sequential equilib-
ria and backward induction
A sequential equilibrium is an assessment (σ, ) which is consistent and sequen-
tially rational. Sequential rationality requires that - at each information set
- the strategy of each player be optimal starting from there according to the
player’s beliefs over the nodes in the information set (as captured by the rele-
vant part of  ) and the strategies of everyone else. Conceptually, little is gained
by expressing sequential rationality in terms of the total pre-order underlying
the consistent assessment (σ, ). However, there is one case where sequential ra-
tionality can be expressed very simply and that is the case where the restriction
of the total pre-order ￿ to the set Z of terminal histories is antisymmetric:
if z,z′ ∈ Z, and z ∼ z′ then z = z′. (P5)
The following lemma is proved in the Appendix.
Lemma 15 Let ￿ be a total pre-order on H that satisﬁes Properties P2, P3
and P5. Then, for every history h ∈ H, there is a unique terminal history z
such that h ∼ z. Call this terminal history z(h) (if h ∈ Z then z(h) = h).
Furthermore, for every decision history h ∈ D, (a) there is a unique action
a ∈ A(h) such that h ∼ a and (b) for all h′ ∈   Ii(h), if h ∼ h′ then h is a preﬁx
of h′.
We will show that, under the hypotheses of Lemma 15, sequential rationality
can be expressed as follows (recall - see Footnote 4 - that, for every player i ∈ N,
Ui : Z → R is i’s payoﬀ function):
∀i ∈ N,∀h ∈ Di,∀a ∈ A(h), Ui(z(h)) ≥ Ui(z(ha)). (P6)
Call a sequential equilibrium (σ, ) pure if the strategy σi of each player
i ∈ N is a pure strategy and   consists of degenerate probability distributions
18(that is, if h ∈ Di and h′ ∈ Ii(h) then either  (h)(h′) = 0 or  (h)(h′) = 1). The
following proposition is proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 16 Fix an extensive-form game without chance moves. Then,
(a) If the players’ beliefs and belief revision policies are represented by a
proﬁle of (possibly iterated) rationalizable choice frames that satisﬁes properties
P1-P6 then the assessment (σ, ) given by (letting ￿ be a total pre-order on H
that rationalizes those choice frames), for all i ∈ N, h ∈ Di and a ∈ A(h), (i)
σi(h)(a) > 0 if and only if h ∼ ha and (ii)  (h) > 0 if and only if h ￿ h′ for
every h′ ∈   Ii(h), is a pure sequential equilibrium.
(b) if (σ, ) is a pure sequential equilibrium then there exists a proﬁle of
(possibly iterated) rationalizable choice frames that satisﬁes properties P1-P4
and P6 such that (letting ￿ be a total pre-order on H that rationalizes those
choice frames), for every i ∈ N, h ∈ Di and a ∈ A(h), (i) h ∼ ha if and only if
σi(h)(a) = 1 and (ii) for every h′ ∈   Ii(h), h ￿ h′ if and only if  (h) = 1.
Note that, since we ruled out chance moves, Proposition 16 does not require
the payoﬀ function Ui of player i to satisfy the von Neumann-Morgenstern
axioms of expected utility; indeed, it could be an ordinal payoﬀ function (that
is, a numerical representation of a total pre-order over Z expressing player i’s
preferences over the elements of Z).
An extensive form has perfect information if every information set is a single-
ton. Figure 6 shows a perfect information game. Associated with each terminal
history are two numbers: the top one is Player 1’s utility (or payoﬀ) and the














An extensive-form game with perfect information
Figure 6
19We shall restrict attention to perfect-information games without chance
moves. The solution concept that is most commonly used for perfect-information
games is that of backward induction, obtained using the following algorithm,
which yields a function λ : A → {0,1} (recall that A is the set of actions). Start
from a decision history h ∈ D whose immediate successors (that is, histories of
the form ha with a ∈ A(h)) are all terminal histories.16 Let a ∈ A(h) be an
action at h that maximizes the payoﬀ of the player assigned to h (that is, if
P(h) = i, then Ui(ha) ≥ Ui(ha′) for all a′ ∈ A(h)). Set λ(a) = 0 and λ(a′) = 1
for all a′ ∈ A(h)\{a}. Now let h ∈ D be a decision history such that every
immediate successor is either a terminal history or a history h′ such that λ has
been deﬁned on A(h′). Select an action a at h that maximizes the payoﬀ of the
player assigned to h, call him player i, under the convention that the payoﬀ of
action a′ ∈ A(h) is Ui(ha′) if ha′ is a terminal history or it is Ui(ha′a1...am)
where ha′a1...am is the terminal history reached from ha′ by following actions
ak with λ(ak) = 0 (k = 1,...,m). As before, set λ(a) = 0 and λ(a′) = 1 for all
a′ ∈ A(h)\{a}. Repeat the procedure until the function λ has been deﬁned on
the entire set A. We call {a ∈ A : λ(a) = 0} a backward-induction solution.
When applied to the game illustrated in Figure 6, the backward induction
algorithm yields two solutions, shown in Figure 7, where the actions assigned
the value 0 are shown as double edges. Thus the function λ corresponding to
the solution on the left is a follows:
action a b c d e f
λ 0 1 0 1 0 1
while the function λ corresponding to the solution on the right is given by:
action a b c d e f


























The two backward-induction solutions of the game of Figure 6
Figure 7
16Such a history h exists because of ﬁniteness of the set of actions A and the assumption
that no action is available at two diﬀerent information sets (see Remark 6).
20Note that the backward induction solution yields an actual play (that is, a
terminal history: ac in the ﬁrst solution shown in Figure 7 and bd in the second
solution) as well as a strategy proﬁle ((a,ce) in the ﬁrst solution and (b,cf) in
the second solution in Figure 7.
In perfect-information games Property P4 is trivially satisﬁed, since h′ ∈
I(h) implies that h′ = h. We now show that, for every perfect-information game,
there is a one-to one correspondence between the set of backward-induction
solutions and the set of total pre-orders on H that satisfy properties P2, P3
and the following property, which is a generalization of P6. First of all some
notation. Fix a total pre-order ￿ on H. For every decision history h ∈ D,
let A0(h) = {a ∈ A(h) : h ∼ ha} and let Z(h) = {z ∈ Z : z ∼ ha for some
a ∈ A0(h)}. If ￿ satisﬁes Properties P2 and P3 then A0(h)  = ∅ and Z(h)  = ∅.
We can now introduce the generalization of P6:
∀i ∈ N, ∀h ∈ Di, ∀z ∈ Z(h), ∀a ∈ A(h), ∀z′ ∈ Z(ha),
Ui(z) ≥ Ui(z′).
(P7)
Property P7 says that if h is a decision history of player i then the utility
of any terminal history reached from h by following only plausibility preserving
actions is not less than the utility of a terminal node reached by taking an
arbitrary action a at h and then continuing from ha by following only plausibility
preserving actions. The following proposition is proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 17 Fix an arbitrary ﬁnite perfect-information game. There is a
one-to-one correspondence between the set of backward-induction solutions and
the set of total pre-orders on H that satisfy properties P2, P3 and P7.
Proposition 17 thus provides a characterization of backward induction in
terms of beliefs and belief revision policies that are represented by proﬁles
{  ,Ei,fi }i∈N of (possibly iterated) rationalizable choice frames (where   = H
and Ei is given by (3)) that satisfy Properties P1-P3 and P7.
6 Conclusion
We applied the notion of AGM-consistent choice frame developed in [7] to
extensive-form games and provided a characterization of the notion of consis-
tent assessment, which is the central part of the notion of sequential equilibrium
introduced by Kreps and Wilson [15]. AGM-consistency is adequate if the ex-
tensive form is such that no player moves more than once along any terminal
history, otherwise the issue of iterated belief revision arises. In extensive forms
with perfect recall the (suitably encoded) information that a player receives at a
later moment is always a reﬁnement of earlier information. This property of in-
formation reﬁnement together with AGM-consistency and a simple postulate for
iterated belief revision ensures that the beliefs of each player are rationalizable
21by a total pre-order on the set of histories. When the same total pre-order ratio-
nalizes the beliefs of all the players, four properties of it yield a characterization
of consistent assessments.
A characterization of pure sequential equiilibria and of backward induction
in perfect-information games was also provided.
In future work we plan to extend the analysis of this paper by exploring
diﬀerent solution concepts for extensive-form games.
A Appendix
In order to prove Proposition 10 we need some preliminary deﬁnitions and lem-
mas.
Remark 18 Recall our assumption that A =
￿
h∈D A(h). Thus, for every a ∈
A there is an h ∈ D such that a ∈ A(h). Recall also the assumption that if
h,h′ ∈ H are such that A(h) ∩ A(h′)  = ∅ then h′ ∈ I(h) (and thus A(h) =
A(h′)).
Notation 19 For every h ∈ H and a ∈ A we write a ∈ h if there exists an
h′ ∈ H such that h′a is a preﬁx of h (thus a ∈ A(h′); recall that the null action
∅ is a preﬁx of every history and thus we set ∅ ∈ h for every h ∈ H).
Remark 20 If ￿ satisﬁes Property P2 then ∅ ￿ h for every h ∈ H.
Deﬁnition 21 An A-weighting is a function λ : A → N such that (1) λ(∅) = 0
and (2) for every h ∈ D, there is at least one a ∈ A(h) with λ(a) = 0. Given a
A-weighting λ, deﬁne Λ : H → N as follows: Λ(h) =
￿
a∈h λ(a).
Lemma 22 Let ￿ be a total pre-order that satisﬁes properties P2-P4. Let
F : H → N be an action-based representation of ￿ (it exists by P4). Deﬁne
λ￿ : A → N as follows: λ￿(∅) = 0 and, for a  = ∅, λ￿(a) = F(ha) − F(h) for
some h such that a ∈ A(h). Then
(i) λ￿ is an A-weighting;
(ii) if Λ￿ : H → N is the associated function (given by Λ￿(h) =
￿
a∈h λ￿(a))
then, for every h ∈ H, Λ￿(h) = F(h) (so that, for every h,h′ ∈ H, Λ￿(h) ≤
Λ￿(h′) if and only if h ￿ h′).
Proof. (i) First of all, λ￿ is well deﬁned since if h and h′ are such that a ∈
A(h) ∩ A(h′) then, by Remark 18, h′ ∈ I(h)17 and thus, by deﬁnition of action
basedness, F(ha) − F(h) = F(h′a) − F(h′). By P2, F(ha) ≥ F(h) and thus,
since F is integer-valued, λ￿(a) ∈ N. By P3, for every h ∈ D there is an
a ∈ A(h) such that ha ∼ h and thus F(ha) = F(h) so that λ￿(a) = 0.
17Without this convention the domain of the weigthing function λ would have to be chosen
as the set of action-history pairs (a,h) with a ∈ A(h). This would make the notation more
complicated, but the proofs would go through.











F(∅) + F(h) = F(h) (since λ￿(∅) = F(∅) = 0).
Lemma 23 Let ￿ be a total pre-order that satisﬁes properties P2-P4. Then,
for every i ∈ N and ˆ h ∈ Di, ∅  = {h : h ￿ h′,∀h′ ∈ Ii(ˆ h)} ⊆ {h : h ￿ h′,∀h′ ∈
  Ii(ˆ h)} (where   Ii(ˆ h) is deﬁned in (2)).
Proof. Fix arbitrary i ∈ N and ˆ h ∈ Di. Then, since ˆ h ∈ Ii(ˆ h), Ii(ˆ h)  = ∅. It
follows from this and the fact that ￿ is a total pre-order that ∅  = {h : h ￿
h′,∀h′ ∈ Ii(ˆ h)}. Now let E = {h : h ￿ h′,∀h′ ∈ Ii(ˆ h)} and F = {h : h ￿
h′,∀h′ ∈   Ii(ˆ h)}. Let h ∈ E and ﬁx an arbitrary h1 ∈   Ii(ˆ h). We want to show
that h ￿ h1, so that h ∈ F. By deﬁnition of   Ii(ˆ h), there exists an h0 ∈ Ii(ˆ h)
such that h0 is a preﬁx of h1. By P2 (see Remark 7), h0 ￿ h1. By hypothesis,
since h ∈ E and h0 ∈ Ii(ˆ h), h ￿ h0. Thus, by transitivity of ￿, h ￿ h1.
Lemma 24 Fix an extensive form and let λ : A → N be an A-weighting with
corresponding Λ : H → N (given by Λ(h) =
￿
a∈h λ(a)). Deﬁne the following
total pre-order ￿λ on H: h ￿λ h′ if and only if Λ(h) ≤ Λ(h′). Then, (i) ￿λ
satisﬁes properties P2-P4. Furthermore, for every i ∈ N, h ∈ Di and a ∈ A(h)
(ii) h ∼λ ha if and only if λ(a) = 0 and (iii) if h is such that h ￿λ h′, for every
h′ ∈ Ii(h), then h ￿λ h′, for every h′ ∈   Ii(h) (where   Ii(h) is deﬁned in (2)).
Proof. (i) Fix i ∈ N, h ∈ Di and a ∈ A(h). Property (P2) is satisﬁed because
Λ(h) ≤ Λ(h) + λ(a) = Λ(ha) and thus, by deﬁnition of ￿λ, h ￿λ ha.
By deﬁnition of A-weighting, for every h ∈ D there exists an a ∈ A(h)
such that λ(a) = 0; thus Λ(ha) = Λ(h) + λ(a) = Λ(h) and therefore ha ￿λ h;
furthermore, for every a ∈ A(h), by deﬁnition of A-weighting, λ(a) ≥ 0 and
thus if ha ￿λ h then Λ(ha) = Λ(h) + λ(a) ≤ Λ(h) which implies that λ(a) = 0
so that, for every h′ ∈ I(h), Λ(h′) + λ(a) = Λ(h′) and hence h′a ￿λ h′. Thus
Property P3 is satisﬁed.
By construction, Λ is an integer-valued representation of ￿λ. Fix arbitrary
h,h′ ∈ D, with h′ ∈ I(h), and a ∈ A(h). Then Λ(ha) − Λ(h) = Λ(h) + λ(a) −
Λ(h) = λ(a). Similarly, Λ(h′a) − Λ(h′) = λ(a). Thus Property P4 is satisﬁed.
(ii) If λ(a) = 0 then Λ(ha) = Λ(h) + λ(a) = Λ(h) and thus h ∼ ha. Con-
versely, if h ∼ ha then Λ(ha) = Λ(h) + λ(a) and thus λ(a) = 0.
(iii) Let i ∈ N and h ∈ H be such that, for every h′ ∈ Ii(h), h ￿ h′ (that is,
Λ(h) ≤ Λ(h′)). We want to show that Λ(h) ≤ Λ(h′) for every h′ ∈   Ii(h). Fix
an arbitrary ˆ h ∈   Ii(h). By deﬁnition of   Ii(h) (see (2)) there exists an h′ ∈ Ii(h)
which is a preﬁx of ˆ h. Thus Λ(h′) ≤ Λ(ˆ h). By hypothesis, Λ(h) ≤ Λ(h′); hence
Λ(h) ≤ Λ(ˆ h) and thus h ￿λ ˆ h.
The following result is proved in Kreps and Wilson ([15], Lemma A.1, p.
887; we have re-written the result in terms of the notation used in this paper
and slightly reworded it).
23Lemma 25 Fix an arbitrary extensive form (with perfect recall). Then
(a) if (σ, ) is a consistent assessment there exists an A-weighting λ : A → N
such that, ∀i ∈ N,∀h ∈ Di,∀a ∈ A(h), (i) λ(a) = 0 if and only if σi(h)(a) > 0,
and (ii)  (h) > 0 if and only if Λ(h) ≤ Λ(h′) for all h′ ∈ Ii(h);
(b) if λ : A → N is an A-weighting, then there exists a consistent assessment
(σ, ) such that, ∀i ∈ N,∀h ∈ Di,∀a ∈ A(h), (i) σi(h)(a) > 0 if and only if
λ(a) = 0 and (ii)  (h) > 0 if and only if Λ(h) ≤ Λ(h′) for all h′ ∈ Ii(h).
Proof of Proposition 10. Fix an extensive form where no player moves
more than once along any history. (a) Let {  ,Ei,fi }i∈N be a proﬁle of AGM-
consistent choice frames (where   = H and Ei is given by (3)) that satisﬁes
properties P1-P4. Let ￿ be a total pre-order of H that rationalizes those frames
(it exists by Proposition 4 and by the hypothesis that P1 is satisﬁed). Then, by
hypothesis, ￿ satisﬁes properties P2-P4. Let λ￿ be the A-weighting deﬁned in
Lemma 22). Deﬁne the following assessment (σ, ): ∀i ∈ N,∀h ∈ Di,∀a ∈ A(h),
(i) σi(h)(a) > 0 if and only if λ￿(a) = 0, and (ii)  (h) > 0 if and only if
Λ￿(h) ≤ Λ￿(h′) for all h′ ∈ Ii(h). Then, by Lemma 25, (σ, ) is a consistent
assessment. Furthermore, by deﬁnition of λ￿, λ￿(a) = 0 if and only if h ∼ ha
and thus σi(h)(a) > 0 if and only if h ∼ ha. by Lemma 23,  (h) > 0 if and only
if h ￿ h′, for all h′ ∈   Ii(h).
(b) Let (σ, ) be a consistent assessment. By (a) of Lemma 25 there exists
a A-weighting λ : A → N such that, ∀i ∈ N,∀h ∈ Di,∀a ∈ A(h), (i) λ(a) = 0
if and only if σi(h)(a) > 0, and (ii)  (h) > 0 if and only if Λ(h) ≤ Λ(h′) for all
h′ ∈ Ii(h). Let ￿λ be the total pre-order on H deﬁned by: h ￿λ h′ if and only
if Λ(h) ≤ Λ(h′). For every player i ∈ N, let   ,Ei,fi  be the following choice
frame:   = H, Ei is given by (3) and fi is given fi(E) = {h ∈ E : h ￿λ h′,∀h′ ∈
E}. Then, by Lemma 24, the proﬁle {  ,Ei,fi }i∈N satisﬁes properties P1-P4.
Furthermore, by Lemma 24, (i) h ∼λ ha if and only if σi(h)(a) > 0 and (ii) for
every h′ ∈   Ii(h), h ￿λ h′ if and only if  (h) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 12. It is shown in [7] that if   ,E,f  is an AGM-consistent
choice frame then it satisﬁes the following property, known as Arrow’s Axiom:
∀S,T ∈ E, if T ⊆ S and f(S) ∩ T  = ∅ then f(T) = f(S) ∩ T. (10)
By Deﬁnition 1, f(E) ⊆ E so that f(E) ∩ E = f(E); furthermore, f(E)  = ∅.
By (5) f′( ) = f(E). Hence, applying (10) to f′ (with S =   and T = E) we
get f′(E) = f′( ) and thus
f′(E) = f(E). (11)
By hypothesis, F ⊆ E and f(E)∩F  = ∅. Thus, by (11), f′(E)∩F  = ∅. Hence,
applying (10) to f′ (with S = E and T = F) we get that f′(F) = f′(E) ∩ F.
Using this and (11) we get
f′(F) = f(E) ∩ F. (12)
24Applying (10) to f (with S = E and T = F) we get that f(F) = f(E) ∩ F. It
follows from this and (12) that f′(F) = f(F).
Proof of Lemma 15. Let ￿ be a total pre-order on H that satisﬁes Proper-
ties P2, P3 and P5 . Fix an arbitrary h ∈ H. We want to show that there exists
a unique z ∈ Z such that h ∼ z. If h ∈ Z then it follows from Property P5 (and
the fact that ￿ is reﬂexive). Suppose, therefore, that h ∈ D. First we show that
there is a z ∈ Z such that h ∼ z. By P2 and P3 there exists an a1 ∈ A(h) such
that h ∼ ha1. If ha1 ∈ Z then we are done; otherwise, by P2 and P3 again,
there exists an a2 ∈ A(ha1) such that ha1 ∼ ha1a2. Repeating this argument a
ﬁnite number of times we get that h ∼ ha1 ∼ ha1a2 ∼ ... ∼ ha1a2...am ∈ Z.18
Thus the desired result follows from transitivity of ∼. Now suppose that h ∼ z
and h ∼ z′ with z,z′ ∈ Z. Then, by transitivity of ∼, z ∼ z′ and thus, by
Property P5, z = z′.
Now ﬁx an arbitrary h ∈ D. (a) Let a1,a2 ∈ A(h) be such that h ∼ ha1
and h ∼ ha2. Then h ∼ ha1 ∼ z(ha1) and h ∼ ha2 ∼ z(ha2), so that - as
shown above - z(ha1) = z(ha2) which implies that a1 = a2. (b) Suppose that
h′ ∈   Ii(h) is such that h ∼ h′. By deﬁnition of   Ii(h), there exists an h0 ∈ I(h)
such that h0 is a preﬁx of h′ and thus, by Property P2, h0 ￿ h′; hence, by
transitivity of ￿, h ∼ h0. Then, since h ∼ z(h) and h0 ∼ z(h0), z(h) ∼ z(h0),
so that, by P5, z(h) = z(h0) and thus h = h0.
Proof of Proposition 16. Fix an extensive game without chance moves.
(a) Let {  ,Ei,fi }i∈N be a proﬁle of AGM-consistent choice frames that
satisﬁes properties P1-P6. Let ￿ be a total pre-order of H that rationalizes
those frames. Then, by (a) of Proposition 14, the assessment (σ, ) given by
σi(h)(a) > 0 if and only if h ∼ ha and  (h) > 0 if and only if h ￿ h′, for all
h′ ∈   Ii(h) is a consistent assessment. By Lemma 15, for every h ∈ D, there is
a unique a ∈ A(h) such that h ∼ ha. Hence it must be that σi(h)(a) = 1. By
(b) of Lemma 15, there is no h′′ ∈ I(h) such that h′′  = h and h′′ ￿ h′, for all
h′ ∈   Ii(h). Thus it must be that  (h) = 1. It follows that, for every h ∈ D,
z(h) (as deﬁned in Lemma 15) is the unique terminal history reached from h
by the strategy proﬁle σ. Thus, by Property P6, (σ, ) is sequentially rational
and therefore it is a pure sequential equilibrium.
(b) Let (σ, ) be a pure sequential equilibrium. Then (σ, ) is a consistent
assessment and by (b) of Proposition 14, there exists a proﬁle of (possibly it-
erated) rationalizable choice frames that satisﬁes properties P1-P4 such that
(letting ￿ be a total pre-order on H that rationalizes those choice frames), for
every i ∈ N, h ∈ Di and a ∈ A(h), (i) h ∼ ha if and only if σi(h)(a) = 1 and
(ii) for every h′ ∈   Ii(h), h ￿ h′ if and only if  (h) = 1 (since (σ, ) is a pure
assessment). It follows that, for every h ∈ D there exists a unique a ∈ A(h)
such that h ∼ ha and thus a unique z ∈ Z such that h is a preﬁx of z and h ∼ z.
Property P6 is an immediate consequence of sequential rationality.
18Since the set of actions is ﬁnite and no action is available at more than one information
set (see Remark 6 ), for every h ∈ D there is a sequence of actions  a1,a2,...,am  such that
ha1a2...am ∈ Z.
25Proof of Proposition 17. Fix an arbitrary perfect-information game
without chance moves and an arbitrary backward-induction solution. Let λ :
A → {0,1} be the associated function obtained in the construction of the so-




λ(ak). Let ￿ be the total pre-order on H deﬁned by
h ￿ h′ if and only if Λ(h) ≤ Λ(h′). Then for every h ∈ D and a ∈ A(h),
Λ(ha) = Λ(h) + λ(a) ≤ Λ(h) so that h ￿ ha and thus Property P2 is satisﬁed.
Property P3 is also satisﬁed, because, by deﬁnition of λ, for every h ∈ D there
exists an a ∈ A(h) such that λ(a) = 0 and therefore Λ(ha) = Λ(h)+λ(a) = Λ(h)
and thus h ∼ ha. Finally Property P7 is satisﬁed by construction.
Conversely, let ￿ be a total pre-order on H that satisﬁes Properties P2, P3
and P7. Deﬁne λ : A → {0,1} as follows: for every h ∈ D choose an arbitrary
a ∈ A(h) such that h ∼ ha (its existence is guaranteed by Properties P2 and
P3) and set λ(a) = 0 and λ(a′) = 1 for every a′ ∈ A(h)\{a}. We want to show
that B = {a ∈ A : λ(a) = 0} is a backward induction solution. This requires
that if i is the player assigned to h ∈ D and a ∈ A(h) is such that λ(a) = 0
then Ui(haa1...am) ≥ Ui(ha′b1...bp) where both haa1...am and ha′a1...ap are
terminal histories, a′ is an arbitrary action in A(h) and, for every j = 1,...,m
and k = 1,...,p, λ(aj) = λ(bj) = 0. But this is precisely what Property P7
guarantees.
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